




























From futures markets to the farm-gate  





























The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and 
research in development studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week diploma 
courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a scientific 
basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working 
papers. The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit 
comments and generate discussion. The series includes academic research by staff, PhD 
participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
Institute of Social Studies 
P.O. Box 29776 
2502 LT The Hague 





Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT  4 
1 INTRODUCTION: A CHANGING CONTEXT FOR ANALYSING PRICE 
TRANSMISSION IN COFFEE MARKETS 5 
2   CURRENT ATTEMPTS AT ASSESSING THE TRANSMISSION AND IMPACT  
OF COMMODITY PRICE CHANGES 6 
3  STUDY OF PRICE TRANSMISSION ALONG TANZANIAN COFFEE CHAINS 10 
3.1 The stylised coffee price chain 10 
3.2 From futures to cash prices: price transmission from the New 
York coffee exchange to physical markets 12 
3.3 From export prices to the Tanzania coffee auction 15 
3.4 From the auction to Kilimanjaro coffee producers 17 
4 CONCLUSIONS 22 





This article contributes to the debate on commodity price transmission and 
offers an alternative perspective of price formation, transmission and the 
producer price experience in low-income countries. By investigating the case 
study of coffee chains, originating in Tanzania the paper demonstrates how the 
joint forces of global financialisation and domestic liberalisation in producing 
countries have acted to reorganize coffee chains into structures in which 
certain chain actors have become increasingly vulnerable to violent price 
swings while others have managed to remain relatively cushioned from such 
movements. 
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From futures markets to the farm-gate1 
Assessing real price transmission along coffee chains 
1 Introduction: A changing context for analysing price 
transmission in coffee markets 
In recent years both research and media attention has been concerned with the 
concept of price transmission and price shares in commodity markets. The 
coffee market has been a particular example of such concern. On the one hand 
research has focused on the diminishing share of retail prices received by low 
income country producers with large retailers and middle-men taking more 
than their fair share of the final price (Milford, 2004; Castle, 2002; Fairtrade 
Foundation, 2012). For these studies niche and speciality markets offer a 
solution, allowing producers to garner higher prices and maintain a greater 
share of the retail price. On the other hand the asymmetry of price 
transmission (both upstream and downstream) has preoccupied numerous 
economists and econometricians (McLaren, 2013; Liu et al, 2012; Krivonos, 
2006; Cudjoe et al, 2010). The main conclusion in these studies has been that 
price falls are passed down to producers more readily than price rises. The 
opposite is the case for the movement from producer to retail markets, with 
price rises more readily passed on than price falls. Distance to market, lack of 
competition, and poor market integration are blamed for such asymmetric 
price transmission. Greater market integration and competition as well as the 
removal of barriers to trade and price distortions would therefore facilitate 
better and less asymmetric price transmission, according to these studies.  
This paper questions the above analyses, from the perspective of method 
as well as the conclusions drawn and offers an alternative perspective of price 
formation, transmission and the producer price experience. It is argued that 
changes in global and national structures play a crucial role in how prices are 
formed, transmitted up and down the supply chain and hence evolving 
institutional contexts must be central to any analysis of the nature and 
implications of price transmission. Through a detailed case study of Tanzanian 
coffee chains, we show how diverse producers at the upstream end experience 
such prices and therefore what the broader implications are for coffee 
production in the longer term. On this basis we introduce the concept of a 
price chain that traces the formation of prices along the supply chain. 
A number of important global, national and local changes have impacted 
commodity markets such as coffee. At the global level shifting demand from 
emerging economies such as India and China has impacted on agricultural 
prices in diverse ways. Commodity prices have also increasingly been 
influenced by the activities of financial investors (Mayer, 2012; Newman, 
2009a,b; Tang and Xiong, 2010). At the domestic or national level many low-
income coffee producing countries have undergone widespread domestic and 
                                                
1 Swiss National Foundation funded project: NCCR-Trade Regulation Project. 
Additional funding for field research was granted by the University of  London,  
Central  Research  Fund. 
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international trade liberalization that have impacted the way in which coffee is 
traded domestically and the way in which prices are formed and transmitted 
across different segments of the market. This process of liberalisation has been 
recorded to have exposed winners and losers and fragmented groups of agents 
or actors, including producers (Bryceson, 1999; Harriss-White, 2000; Oya, 
2005).  
We present the case study of coffee chains originating in Tanzania to 
demonstrate how the joint forces of global financialisation and domestic 
liberalisation in producing countries have acted to reorganize coffee chains into 
structures in which certain chain actors have become increasingly vulnerable to 
violent price swings while others have managed to remain relatively cushioned 
from such movements. This in turn will have longer term implications for the 
sustainability and structure of coffee production and coffee trading in 
Tanzania.  This study is not an econometric study in price transmission, 
measuring the cointegration or comovement of international and domestic 
prices for a specific commodity. Instead, it brings together in depth research of 
price transmission and price experience in Tanzania and internationally to 
highlight some of the inadequacies of standard price transmission approaches. 
By drawing on two interlinked research projects that investigated different 
ends of the coffee price chain using a variety of methods over 2006 and 2007, 
this article demonstrates the complexities and changing nature of price 
transmission in international commodity markets. 
In particular, this paper goes beyond previous studies of price 
transmission along commodity chains by tracing the integrated process of price 
formation from futures markets to producers and studying the impact this has 
on diverse actors at the extremities of the coffee chain.. The paper 
demonstrates the heightened volatility of international coffee prices introduced 
by the financialisation of coffee markets and how this is experienced by 
different actors along the chain.  We demonstrate how certain exporters are 
able to manage this volatility better than others and how the Tanzanian coffee 
auction performs an important price stabilising role within the chain. Finally, 
we demonstrate how producers’ experience of coffee prices is diverse and 
while cooperative unions have facilitated greater price stability, many of the 
poorest producers are exposed to real price transmission asymmetries. Such 
price asymmetries will only be exacerbated if further market integration and 
domestic price liberalisation continue unabated.   
2   Current attempts at assessing the transmission and 
impact of  commodity price changes 
Recent studies of price transmission across spatially separate markets both 
horizontally and vertically have focussed on the statistical relationship between 
prices in physical markets2 (Abdulai, 2000; Cudjoe, et al. 2010; Krivonos, 2004,  
                                                
2 Vertical price transmission refers to the transmission of price signals along the 
supply were as horizontal price transmission refers to the transmission of price signals 
between geographically separated markets at the same level of the supply chain. 
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2006; Lui et al, 2012; McLaren, 2013; Rapsomanikis et al, 2006). These studies 
have been based on concepts related to competitive pricing behaviour. The law 
of comparative advantage dictates that resources will be allocated efficiently in 
the absence of impediments to free trade. This in turn implies that factor and 
product prices in spatially separated markets will differ only by transfer costs. 
Given that the definition of market integration implied by the standard spatial 
equilibrium model links directly to price outcomes, cointegration analysis has 
become the most prominent analytical tool employed in empirical studies on 
market integration.3  
The increased role of financial markets in shaping commodity prices is 
now widely accepted in academic and policy circles (see for example 
UNCTAD, 2011). Despite their common deployment of cointegration analyses 
studies on price transmission within physical markets and price transmission 
between futures and spot prices have been conducted separately, with the 
former applied to issues of market integration4 and the latter to the efficiency 
of futures markets. The implicit assumption is that futures markets facilitate 
efficient price discovery and accurately reflects supply and demand for the 
underlying commodity. In this way Commodity futures markets are viewed as 
functioning to complete markets in the Arrow-Debreu sense by enhancing 
efficient allocation across geographically separate markets (Arrow and Debreu, 
1954). In this way, the relationship between futures and physical markets are 
assumed away as if there is a seamless interface between the two. 
For the most part, research on the comovement of international and 
domestic prices has purported to reveal an improvement in the integration of 
prices, following the removal of policies that distort the market. Rapsomanikis 
et al (2006) find evidence of greater integration in markets where government 
intervention is lower. Krivonos (2004) also finds support for improved 
transmission of prices from world coffee prices to producers across sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America. Imai et al (2008) show that, in the case of 
India and China, the transmission of prices from world to domestic markets is 
incomplete due to government intervention.  
Evidence from cointegration analysis applied to the study of efficient price 
discovery on commodity futures markets has been mixed (Bosco, Sabuhoro 
and Larue, 1997; Fortenbery and Zapata, 1997; Bowman and Husain, 2004; 
Fortenbery and Zapata, 2004).  
Researchers have come to varying conclusions regarding the efficiency of 
commodity futures markets and whether futures prices as unbiased predictors of 
future spot prices (Bowman and Husain, 2004, p4).   
                                                
3 In addition, cointegration and error correction models allow the researcher to test 
notions such as completeness, speed, and asymmetry of the relationship between 
prices 
4 Markets are taken to have become more integrated if the degree of pass-through of 




In their study, Bowman and Hussain (1994) found that most commodity 
prices appeared to be cointegrated with at least their 3-month or 6-month 
futures price series. 
Most studies on price transmission have focused on demonstrating the 
positive aspects of greater integration between financial futures and 
international and domestic commodity markets. Three major issues with the 
literature and evidence in the area of price transmission can be noted. Firstly, 
while most analyses of futures and cash price cointegration have exclusively 
focused on the relationship between price series, some recent studies have 
illuminated some of the structural factors underlying these relationships. For 
example, Newman (2009a) finds that during periods where financial investors 
dominate futures trading volumes on the New York Coffee Exchange, there is 
a loosening in the relationship between futures prices and supply and demand 
conditions for physical coffee. Rather than providing evidence for efficient 
price discovery on futures markets, a finding that futures and cash prices are 
cointegrated, with futures prices leading cash prices could be interpreted as 
evidence for financial investment activity on futures markets driving prices on 
cash markets. 
A second major issue with most standard price cointegration studies 
relates to the data used to derive these results. Producer price data from low-
income countries is notoriously unreliable and will therefore not necessarily 
represent the true price received by a particular producer at a particular point 
in time (Baffes, 2005). Research on price comovement and market integration 
also falls short of addressing the distribution of income between different 
vertical markets and actors. Where research has focused on producer price 
shares out of world prices, most studies conclude that liberalisation has led to 
higher producer shares out of world prices (Temu et al, 2001, Krivonos, 2004, 
Baffes, 2005). Evidently, however, considering producer prices themselves 
does not give us a clear indication of the relative income received by producers 
and other chain actors. Following liberalisation, many producers in low-income 
countries face higher input costs as well as increased costs associated with 
transportation of their crop as markets are no longer fixed (Bargawi, 2009).  
Thirdly and finally, the objectives of greater price transmission and market 
integration in the context of commodity dependent LICs can be questioned. 
From the perspective of producers, greater transmission leads to greater pass 
through of price volatility and may therefore be second best to a situation 
where producer incomes are stabilised. Improved comovement of prices in 
different vertical markets may also result in faster and asymmetric price 
transmission along the chain. From the retail perspective there is evidence of 
such asymmetric effects that mean increases in wholesale prices are more 
quickly passed on to consumers and retail markets than negative downturns 
(Abdulai, 2006; Morisset, 1998). There is some suggestion that the opposite is 
the case on the production side, with negative changes passed down more 
quickly than positive ones (Cudjoe et al, 2010; Krovonos, 2006; Lui et al, 2012; 
McLaren, 2013).  
Results from East African coffee markets indicate that coffee producers in 
Tanzania and Uganda have not benefited from positive price movements in 
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the same way as they have been detrimentally impacted by negative changes 
(Fafchamps, Vargas Hill et al, 2008; Krivonos, 2004; Newman, 2009a). Limited 
access to market information and exploitation by traders is often cited as the 
reason for this phenomenon (Fafchamps, Vargas Hill et al. 2008), although 
deeper analysis of these structural causes is limited. 
Evidence from price transmission studies can be summarised as 
demonstrating mixed and sometimes conflicting results. Markets appear more 
integrated and therefore price transmission between vertical markets is 
improved. Structural factors that may explain the increased cointegration 
between markets tend not to be analysed and concerns over data mean that, at 
the upstream end of the supply chain, analysis is questionable. Increasing 
evidence of asymmetric price transmission suggests that other factors are 
helping to shape the price experience. Most analysts have put this down to a 
variety of market failures, from a lack of competition to poor market 
integration and lack of information; all of which could be solved by greater 
competition in the demand and supply of the commodity (McLaren, 2013; Liu 
et al, 2012; Krivonos, 2006; Cudjoe et al, 2010). Finally, the distribution of 
incomes across vertical commodity markets and actors is far from clear from 
current research, as the determination of prices has become more diverse and 
factors influencing incomes have changed (Kaplinski and Kimmis, 2006).  
By contrast to the mainstream economic literature, commodity chain 
approaches have placed issues of structure and power at the centre of their 
analyses (Fold, 2002; Gereffi, 1994; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Kaplinsky and 
Fitter, 2004). The strength of the various chain approaches to the study of 
contemporary commodity markets lies in their focus on endogenous 
explanations for changes in the functioning of chains, offering the potential for 
dealing with the political economy. 
Prices at different nodes of a value chain are not exclusively determined by the 
volumes of demand and supply. They are also determined by oligopolistic 
behaviour, the ownership of stocks, and the actions of investment funds in 
futures markets. (Daviron and Ponte, 2006, p256)  
While commodity chain literature has filled many of the gaps of current 
economic analyses of commodity markets by taking a holistic approach and 
incorporating structural and policy issues, investigations into commodity prices 
have not been entirely complete. Where commodity pricing and income shares 
have been considered, the focus has been on the separation of groups 
according to certain activities and points in the production and marketing 
system (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). Overlaps between markets and agents at 
each point in the commodity chain are usually not fully explored in the 
commodity-chain literature, although these will be relevant in understanding 
the role of particular institutions, such as cooperatives, in performing more 
than one task within the commodity chain (Bernstein, 1996). Furthermore, 
each link in the chain tends to be seen as encompassing a homogeneous set of 
actors (Oya, 2002). The focus of most commodity chain analyses is therefore 
on power relations and heterogeneity between these groups rather than within 
them. There has also been a tendency for the various chain approaches to 
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neglect the relationship between commodity chains and their wider economic 
context as well as interchain relationships. One way in which this has occurred 
has been the failure to consider the role of finance and financial markets within 
commodity chains. Financial markets have shaped the structure and 
functioning of physical chains and have acted as a bridge and coordinating 
mechanism across chains. Chain analyses have also neglected to consider the 
role played by powerful agents (from within as well as outside the chain) in 
seeking out profits from their participation on commodity derivatives markets 
(Milberg, 2008; Newman, 2009b).  
This paper compliments some of the above research and addresses the 
shortcomings of current price transmission research by incorporating financial 
market developments at the international level and investigating post-
liberalisation institutional changes within Tanzania and for coffee. By also 
considering the impact of unstable commodity prices on groups of 
heterogeneous producers and market actors, this paper adds to the limitations 
of standard commodity-chain research.  
3  Study of  price transmission along Tanzanian coffee 
chains 
The following study of price transmission along Tanzanian coffee chains 
constitutes a synthesis of results from primary research conducted by the 
authors in 2006 and 2007.  Results are drawn from stakeholder interviews, 
village level surveys and producer interviews conducted during field research in 
Europe and Tanzania.5 
3.1 The stylised coffee price chain 
The best place to begin an analysis of price transmission is by looking at a 
stylised picture of prices along the price chain from international futures 
market prices down to producer prices in Tanzania. Figure 1 shows how 
futures prices influence export and in turn auction and finally producer prices 
downstream. The right-hand side of the chain includes forms of non-standard 
or speciality price transmission channels. In this paper, the main analysis is 
focused on the price transmission for bulk Arabica coffee. Figure 1 resembles 
that of the coffee supply chain (see for example Newman, 2009b) except with 
the flow in the opposite direction. As will be discussed in greater detail below, 
rather than determined entirely on the basis of supply and demand realities at 
each point of exchange as would be predicted by orthodox economic theory, 
increasingly prices determination at all points in the chain occur in relation to 
prices arising on international commodity exchanges, the ICE exchange in 
                                                
5 The field research was funded by grants awarded by the University of London 
Central Research Committee and the SOAS Research Committee. For more 




New York for the case of Arabica coffee and the London LIFFE market for 
Robusta.6 
Figure 1 
The Stylised Coffee Price Chain in Tanzania 
 
The above simplistic, stylised chain is where many price transmission 
studies begin and end, investigating the extent to which prices in one segment 
move alongside prices in another segment and whether there is any asymmetry 
in how prices evolve. Below we break down the above stylised picture to 
investigate the dynamics of price transmission and the true price experience 
between the different segments for bulk or standard grade Arabica coffee. We 
have numbered these points in the chain one, two and three above and will 
address each of these price transmission relationships in turn.  
                                                
6 The formation of price on futures markets and their transmission to local markets do 
not violate the predictions of orthodox economics as long as futures markets are 
efficient and efficiently perform their r price discovery role in such a way that 
accurately reflects supply and demand conditions.  
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3.2 From futures to cash prices: price transmission from the 
New York coffee exchange to physical markets 
As discussed above, observed comovements and long run equilibrium 
statistical relationships between futures prices and physical prices for coffee tell 
us nothing about the actual processes by which prices appearing on the 
international exchange are translated to the actual prices at which physical 
coffee is transacted. This section focuses on the trading practices of 
international traders with headquarters in consuming countries, particularly in 
Europe and the US. International traders sit between roasters and exporters in 
the vertical organisation of the international coffee supply system. The coffee 
industry at the international trader level is highly concentrated, with the top 
five companies accounting for a market share of over 55%.  
As well as the large international coffee trading companies, there exist a 
number of small coffee trading companies, each accounting for a very small 
share of world market. The small international coffee trading companies often 
operate in speciality and niche markets such as fair-trade. While these 
companies do supply some of the large roasters, the relatively small volumes 
that they deal in mean that their buyers tend to be small or artisan roasters. 
As a matter of course, the largest of the trade houses hedge all green 
coffee trades. ED&F Man and the Neumann Kaffee Gruppe have their own 
in-house options and futures brokerages in ED&F Man Commodity Advisors 
Limited and TRX Futures, respectively. Smaller traders, particularly those 
dealing in speciality grades of coffee, either do not hedge or will hedge only a 
proportion of their traded volume. The main reason for this difference in the 
hedging practices of these two types of firms stems from difference in the 
process of coffee trading and pricing for the bulk grades compared with the 
speciality grades. A coffee trader sums up the practice of trading bulk coffee in 
the following quote: 
That’s the first thing you look at, New York and London….And a differential 
against the market. On a commercial grade it will be a description, let’s say 
Columbia Excelsior, that grade will sell for between level money (which means 
the same price on New York) to plus 2, plus 2.5. It won’t fluctuate far from that 
band, fob. And so when we’re buying we try and buy at level money and when 
we’re selling we try to sell at plus 2 and that’s our 2 cent margin, and if we can 
make 2 cents we’re a very happy trade house. On that sort of commercial grade, 
that’s the sort of business it is. And if people aren’t selling at level money then we 
are not buying, pretty much as simple as that.7 
Trade in bulk grades are conducted by larger traders. The margins on such 
trades are small and trading companies derive their incomes from dealing in 
very large volumes, usually supplying the largest multinational coffee roasting 
companies. The sourcing of bulk quality coffee from around the world takes 
place on a continuous basis. 
                                                
7 Quote taken from an interview with coffee trader from an international trading 
company conducted in 2007 
13 
 
International trading companies purchase coffee from local exporters or 
companies within their trading group located at origin. For coffee from a 
particular origin, the international trader decides upon a differential to the 
international exchange at which he is willing to purchase coffee on that day. 
This differential reflects difference in quality of the contracted coffee 
compared with minimum quality deliverable on either of the international 
exchanges. The trader then contacts his suppliers with this offer price and the 
negotiation proceeds based upon local market conditions. Coffee is purchased 
on a price to be fixed basis, at a differential, fob, with the seller’s option to fix. 
It is up to the seller to decide to fix the price at a particular time. The actual 
price at which the coffee is exchanged will be the futures price at the point of 
fixing, plus or minus the agreed differential. Since the international trader 
hedges by offsetting his position in physicals with futures contracts, the time at 
which the price is fixed is of little importance. On the other hand local 
exporters tend not to be hedged so the time at which they fix can be of great 
importance. A seller may hold off fixing the price if he expects the futures 
price to rise further, he can also lose money if the futures price falls below the 
price at which he purchased coffee.  
The large roasting companies do not purchase commercial grades of 
coffee on a continuous basis but will be in the market at a particular time for a 
particular grade. For example, a roaster will enter the market at some point in 
order to secure the Central American coffees that he needs for the following 
three to twelve months. The roasting company will make the trading 
companies aware of their needs, and invite offers from the various traders. 
Once again the contract price will be based on a differential of the relevant 
international exchange but with the buyer’s option to fix. The price at which 
physical coffee of commercial grades is bought and sold at the international 
trade is inextricably linked to the price of coffee futures contracts on the New 
York and London exchanges. 
The wholesale use of price to be fixed contracts in the bulk coffee trade at 
the international trader level cements the relationship between the physical and 
the futures markets for coffee. The use of these contracts, as opposed to fixed 
price forward contracts, means that the volatile prices on international 
exchanges are transmitted more rapidly and fully into the actual prices at which 
physical coffee is traded. This has implications on the way in which futures 
prices are transmitted from international exchanges, via international traders, 
upstream along individual coffee chains towards the production end of the 
chain. As another coffee trader observed: 
[T]he futures price is the determinant all along the chain. It feeds right down 
through because at any point on any given day there is not going to be anyone 
who is able to put a price that is drastically much higher or lower than anyone 
who is basing themselves on the futures market….This is not so much in the 
speciality market but in the trading in the bulk commodities, it is very much the 
futures market.8  
                                                
8 Quote taken from an interview with a coffee trader from an international trading 
house conducted in 2007. 
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The rise of commodities as an asset class in portfolio investment has led 
to a dislocation between prices appearing on the futures market and supply and 
demand conditions in physical markets for coffee. The inclusion of coffee 
futures in a number of hedge and commodity index funds has meant that 
coffee prices have increasingly reflected changes in financial markets more 
widely. For example, Newman (2009a) shows that the commodities boom 
between 2002 and 2007 that was in the first instance driven by increasing 
demand from India and China for industrial inputs also put upward pressure 
on coffee prices despite the absence of an associated change in the supply and 
demand for physical coffee. More recently, Tang and Xiong (2010) has shown 
that growing index investment in commodities markets since the early 2000s 
has resulted in increased correlation between futures prices of commodities 
which are otherwise unrelated in terms of supply and demand dynamics. The 
onset of the financial crisis with the collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage 
market in the latter half of 2007 saw an acceleration in the increase of 
commodity prices despite the anticipation of falling demand in the near future 
associated with a global economic downturn (figure 2). Price increases 
accelerated as investors shifted funds from equity markets to commodities 
until the bubble burst in August 2008 and prices fell rapidly to pre-2007 levels9.  
Figure 2 
Monthly commodity price behaviour 1995-2013 (2005 =100) 
 
Source: IMF IFS 2013 
                                                
9 Prices recovered after 2009 but have stagnated since 2011 with the slowdown in 
growth in emerging economies. 
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From the discussion above we can draw two major conclusions with 
respect to the transmission of prices from the international exchange to those 
that appear in the actual transactions between coffee roasters and international 
traders, and international traders and local exporters in producing countries. 
Firstly, futures prices that increasingly reflect global economic conditions, 
global commodity markets, and subsequently the supply and demand for 
coffee derivatives rather than for physical coffee, exert a major influence on 
real export prices for bulk coffee from countries such as Tanzania. Second, this 
is less of a concern for larger trading houses as they are either vertically 
integrated in the supply chain and/or can use hedging instruments to manage 
the risk of price instability. For smaller traders and local exporters, however, 
the influence of futures prices and the instability that this brings has more 
negative consequences.  
3.3 From export prices to the Tanzania coffee auction 
The world coffee price is brought to Tanzania by the international coffee 
trading companies that make up by far the largest share of coffee purchased 
from origin countries. The way in which international coffee prices are 
transmitted downstream (from international markets to producers) along the 
chain depends crucially in the structure of the marketing system in the origin 
country.  
There are two channels by which coffee is exported from Tanzania, via 
the auction and through direct export. The vast majority of coffee exports go 
through the coffee auction (over 80%), where exporters purchase graded and 
bagged green coffee. Here we focus on the auction system as the mediator of 
price transmission for the majority of coffee exports from Tanzania.10 For a 
number of commentators, ‘the auction appears to be an efficient pricing 
mechanism, in the sense that realized prices move in accordance with the New 
York Board of Trade futures prices’ (Baffes, 2005, p.35). 
Licensed buyers at the coffee auction include private export companies 
(dominated by subsidiaries of MNC trading companies) and cooperative 
unions. For the bulk grades of coffee, the decision for exporters to purchase 
coffee at the auction will depend upon the sales that have been secured and 
their need to secure coffee in order fulfil forward contracts. Since these sales 
will be made at a differential on a price to be fixed contract, the New York and 
London prices determine the price at which the exporter will purchase bulk 
grades at the auction. Two of the four MNC exporters interviewed operated as 
the buying arms of their group. Coffee sales to roasters are made through the 
                                                
10 In the 2007/8 season, direct exports accounted for 16.1% of total coffee exports by 
volume. (Data from Tanzania Coffee Association 2009). Direct export licenses are 
granted to the owners of coffee, estates or smallholder farmers organised into farmers 
groups, where coffee samples have been approved by the TCB to qualify as speciality 
grades. In addition, the seller of the coffee must have a buyer secured who is willing to 
pay a premium price for the coffee. 
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European offices and the exporter based in Tanzania is issued with shipping 
instructions for these sales.  
The process of purchasing and exporting speciality grades differs from 
that for the bulk grades. Firstly, exporters are less likely to sell specialty coffee 
on contracts which are far forward. Overseas buyers of speciality quality tend 
to procure coffee on the basis of a sample of the coffee that the exporter has 
already in stock. Speciality coffee exporters, including the cooperative union 
exporters, have closer and more direct ties with their market. These exporters 
will have a good idea of what their customers are looking for and purchase 
coffee on the auction accordingly. The pricing of speciality coffees differs from 
the bulk also. They tend to sell on a large positive differential to New York. 
This differential is realised on the basis of a sample through analysis and 
cupping by the exporter and his client. Coffee that is destined for the gourmet 
market may be priced with no consideration for the New York price. 
Figure 3 
Nominal Arabica coffee prices in US$ per kg 
 
Sources: ICO Indicator Price for Mild Arabica are taken from www.ico.org (1995/96-2012/13); Export 
and Auction Prices were obtained from the Tanzania Coffee Board; KNCU Producer Prices are taken 
from the basic KNCU price offered to producers prior to receipt of final payment. Exchange rate: 
International Financial Statistics, Official rate at end of period – National currency per US$. 
In the 2010/11 crop year, 60% of mild Arabica coffee sold at auction was 
made up of the premium and speciality grades.11  Since the pricing of these 
coffees can be less dependent on New York it might be expected that swings 
in prices on the New York market will not be as fully reflected in the auction 
                                                
11 The figure of 60% was calculated based on the categorisation of AA, A and PB 
grades under premium and speciality coffee.   
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prices. This would explain the findings by Krivonos (2004) that there was a 
slight reduction in the degree of price transmission between world and local 
coffee prices in Tanzania. In contrast to Krivonos’ own interpretation of 
Tanzania, the weakening in the cointegration relationship between world and 
local coffee prices can be interpreted as the consequence of the TCB’s strategy 
to differentiate green coffee at the auction and market speciality grades where 
prices are realised differently. In addition to a weak relationship between 
“world” prices and auction prices, we might expect increases in price on the 
New York exchange to be more fully reflected in the auction price than 
decreases. This is suggested by the movement of auction prices in figure 3, 
with large positive spikes in 1997/98 and again in 2011/12.  
The auction system in Tanzania has certain other attributes and performs 
important functions in terms of price transmission and price stabilisation that 
are often overlooked. Since 2001 domestic buyers and traders of coffee have 
been legally separated from international exporters. The blind, electronic 
auction system facilitates this separation, forcing exporters to wait until the 
auction convenes (twice every month during the buying season) to purchase 
Tanzanian coffee at a price based on its grade. In this way the auction system 
helps to shield those further upstream of the supply chain (cooperatives and 
private domestic traders) from daily price fluctuations. It helps to reduce the 
amplitude and frequency of sudden price changes in international futures 
markets from being transmitted further up the price chain.  
Comparisons with Uganda (Newman, 2009b) and with Tanzanian cotton 
(Bargawi, 2009), both of which lack an auction system and where exporters 
and producers are in direct contact at the point of sale, suggest that the auction 
is relatively successful in this regard. In general cooperative and private 
producer prices are more stable in Tanzania than in Uganda for coffee and 
more stable than those reported by Tanzanian cotton producers.   
3.4 From the auction to Kilimanjaro coffee producers 
While the coffee auction discussed above performs an important role in terms 
of information provision and price stabilisation, auction prices do not 
necessarily reflect the prices or coffee income received by producers due to the 
intervening functions of local cooperative unions, traders and other factors. In 
terms of domestic price transmission, the Tanzanian coffee marketing system, 
with its parallel cooperative and private marketing channels, and the existence 
of a central auction, reveals some interesting complexities (see figure 4).   
There are four main channels by which smallholder coffee is marketed 
locally. Firstly, the purely private marketing channel consists of private coffee 
buyers (PCBs) purchasing parchment at the farm-gate or at local buying posts. 
The PCBs deliver the parchment coffee to the dry mills for processing at a fee. 
The coffee is then stored and ready for auction. While the ownership of the 
coffee is transferred to the parchment buyer in the private marketing chains, 
ownership of the coffee remains with the farmers until the auction in the three 
remaining marketing channels.  
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Secondly, the traditional cooperative channel is still in operation in the 
Kilimanjaro region. Farmers deposit coffee at the primary society where it is 
inspected and weighed. The farmer is given a first payment for the coffee. The 
collected parchment is transported to the Union owned mill and processed. 
Once the coffee has been auctioned, the farmers receive a second payment for 
the difference between the auction price and the first payment, with costs 
deducted.  
Figure 4 
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The remaining two marketing channels utilise elements of the cooperative 
marketing system. A number of primary societies have left the unions to which 
they once belonged and have formed alliances with other farmers groups to 
market their coffee. Here, cooperation between the groups is for marketing 
purposes only. The final, and most recently introduced, marketing channel is 
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that which is coordinated by producer support organisations (PSOs) for direct 
export which we will not discuss in detail here.12 
The continued economic viability and functioning of the cooperative 
unions in most regions has allowed these to provide producers with a more 
stable producer price. Producers in Kilimanjaro region who sell to KNCU 
should therefore face more stable prices than those selling to private 
companies. This is due to the KNCU’s stable payment system, which offers 
producers the opportunity to sell their crop early but still benefit from 
potential increases in price once the crop has been sold to exporters through 
the auction. Most coffee producers in Kilimanjaro region have completed 
harvesting and selling their coffee by December and relative gains from price 
increases will evidently depend on year to year price developments. 
Furthermore, prices within the region in which KNCU operates are unified 
across geographical areas. Producers who chose to sell their coffee to private 
companies at village buying posts are not able to benefit from this additional 
payment system and instead receive a one-off price. 
In general, therefore, producers selling outside the cooperative system are 
more exposed to unexpected price shifts than those participating in the 
cooperative scheme. However, other factors are also important. A 
consideration of nominal versus real prices is necessary for understanding the 
transmission of real prices to Tanzanian coffee producers. As figure 3 shows, 
in nominal terms, producer prices initially increased following liberalisation in 
the mid-1990s but subsequently gradually declined over time to reach a low in 
2001/02. Since then coffee prices have started to rise again in nominal terms. 
 A consideration of real producer prices reveals an intensification and 
asymmetry in the way international prices have been passed down to 
producers. Deflating Arabica coffee prices by the Tanzanian consumer price 
index and comparing them to domestic food prices in figure 5 demonstrates 
this process. Producers have been particularly hit by the dramatic real fall in 
coffee prices over the late 1990s and early 2000s, with prices in 2001/02 
representing a quarter of prices in 1997/98. At the same time, the stark 
increase in the international coffee price since the early 2000s has not been 
experienced in the same way by producers.  
Data shortages prevent us from analysing the progression of nominal 
producer prices relative to both the cost of informal, seasonal labour and non-
labour inputs, such as pesticides. In the context of Tanzanian coffee farming, 
some of the central input related expenses are chemical pesticides, fungicides 
and insecticides. Full timeseries datasets of insecticide and pesticide prices are 
not available and further complications are created by the proliferation of 
                                                
12 These are largely funded by external donors and the organisations deliver 
programmes and services aimed at developing the smallholder coffee sector in 
Tanzania. The projects aim to improve the quality of smallholder coffee and market it 
externally as speciality coffee. The main strategy for improving quality is through 
central processing. Rather than collect home processed parchment, farmers engaged in 
these marketing channels deliver dry cherry to central pulpery units (CPUs)/washing 
stations where it is processed. PSOs follow a similar payment system as the Unions. 
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brand names and types of chemical inputs licensed for use on coffee since 
liberalisation of the input market. 
However, we can determine from our own surveys as well as from 
secondary data that the real cost of these inputs has increased noticeably since 
liberalisation, leaving producers with an even lower real price than depicted in 
figure 5. Comparing the cost of one commonly used chemical  (Karate 5 EC)  
over time, a study of prices in the 1999/2000 season put this at TSH 9375 per 
litre equivalent in real terms (Itika and Makauki 2007). By 2005/2006, 
according to Agenda (2006), the cost of this had almost doubled in real terms. 
More recent data collected by the Regional Agricultural Input Market 
Information and Transparency System (AMITSA 2013) also shows an increase 
in the nominal price of a commonly used fertilizer, DAP, between 2010 and 
2013. Wholesale prices rose from roughly TSH 1000 per litre in 2010 to over 
TSH 1800 in 2012. They have since fallen back slightly to TSH 1600 in the first 
half of 2013. 
Figure 5 
Real coffee producer prices (1995/96-2009/10) 
 
Sources: The real coffee price is calculated using the producer price (KNCU  in TSH/kg 1995/96-
2009/10) divided by the national consumer price index (World Development Indicators using 1999/2000 
as a deflator. The relative prices are given by the nominal price in TSH/kg divided by the sum of the 




This picture is also reflected is the information gathered during field 
interviews with producers.13 The majority of coffee producers reported 
witnessing a decline in real prices over recent years. A minority of producers 
across the three villages reported a slight increase in nominal prices in the 
2004/05 and/or 20005/06 season. These producers also reported an 
accompanied increase in the cost of inputs, particularly insecticide and 
fungicide. As a result, income from coffee for the majority of producers had 
declined over recent years.  
Price instability within the season was predominantly a concern for those 
marketing their coffee outside the cooperative system. As a result, roughly half 
of those interviewed were not aware of particular patterns or instability of 
prices over the season and had made no attempt at managing this or timing the 
sale of their crop. Producers selling to private buyers were more aware of 
increased within-season volatility over recent years and the general pattern of 
rising prices as the season progresses. Table 1 reports prices received by 
producers in the 2006/07 season across the three villages investigated. 
Reported producer prices were diverse, depending on which statistics are 
considered. Furthermore, the prices received by producers varied between and 
within villages.  
Table 1 























Kiruweni 2750 1500 1500 1800 358 
Narumu 2750 1500 1700 1200 105 
Wanri 2750 1500 1700 1400 82 
 
Differences in the average prices received by producers for their coffee are 
quite stark. On average, producers in Kiruweni village obtained a higher price 
for their coffee in 2006/07 when compared with the other two villages and 
especially when compared with Narumu village. However, the spread of prices 
was also greater in Kiruweni village when compared with the other two 
villages. The above picture regarding prices in 2006/07 is also reflected in the 
longer term view of prices at the village level, where producers in Kiruweni 
reported a slightly more positive view of price developments. Wanri and 
                                                
13 The analysis and reporting of results in this section rely on data primarily originating 
from semi-structured producer interviews, as well as village-level focus groups and 
interviews with agricultural extension staff in the 2006/07 production year. 35 coffee 
producers of different size and wealth, across three villages (Kiruweni, Wanri and 
Narumu villages) in Kilimanjaro region were interviewed to obtain information 
regarding price experiences and impacts. 
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Narumu village on the other hand displayed a particularly negative view of 
price developments over recent years.  
Taking our analysis beyond that of the village, we can investigate how 
producers of different wealth experienced prices and price changes.14 The first 
thing to note here is that producers in the highest wealth category tended to 
have a more positive experience of prices when compared to medium and 
poorer producers. That is not to say that the wealthiest producers across the 
three villages did not note the drop in prices in 1999-2002 but that the price 
shock itself and the impact on income was less severe for these producers. A 
particular distinction that can be made on the basis of producer wealth relates 
to the impact of within season price changes. Wealthier producer tended to not 
be faced with this problem, largely because of their involvement and use of 
cooperative marketing channels and their ability to store their crop and 
monitor price developments so as to sell their coffee strategically to receive the 
best possible price. Poorer producers, however, tended out of necessity, to sell 
their crop in one lump sum, to private traders and were at the mercy of the 
price offered at the time of sale.  
The above considerations suggest that coffee producers in the Kilimanjaro 
region have been exposed to considerable real price erosion since the 
mid1990s, although the exact impacts have been diverse. When international 
and export prices have fallen producers have borne the brunt of the impact in 
both real and nominal terms. When prices have risen, producers in general 
have, however, not benefitted proportionally, largely due to the concurrent 
increases in the cost of inputs and the cost of food. Given the earlier 
discussion regarding the role of the auction in Tanzania, one can speculate that 
a counterfactual situation in which no auction system exists would expose 
Tanzanian coffee producers even further to the above problems.  
The results also suggest that producers marketing their coffee via the local 
cooperative union are better protected from price falls than those selling to 
private traders. This split between private and cooperative marketing also has a 
relative wealth dimension, with many of the poorest producers forced to sell to 
private agents at lower and more unstable prices.    
4 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the nature of price transmission from futures markets 
along different segments of coffee chains and their implications for Tanzanian 
coffee farmers.  Four main points can be drawn from our analysis of the 
processes of price transmission and implications of falling and rising 
commodity prices. Firstly, it has been argued that there has been a dislocation 
between movements in coffee futures prices and changes in physical supply 
                                                
14 Information on the following producer characteristics was used to form a relative 
index of wealth within the villages: labour employment and use; land ownership; cattle 
ownership; make-up and build of the main family home; village political and elite 
positions held in the past and present. 
23 
 
and demand conditions owing to the rise of commodities as an asset class in 
portfolio investment. The increasing influence of futures markets in coffee 
price formation at the international level has meant that general commodity 
price changes have accentuated world coffee price movements in the shorter 
term.   
Secondly, the way in which prices are transmitted from the world level to 
coffee producers depends crucially on the structure of the domestic marketing 
system. The auction system in Tanzania has cushioned the transmission of 
daily international price movements to domestic traders, including the 
cooperative unions. By creating an anonymous auction that convenes only 
twice a month and a legal separation of domestic and export trading, from the 
perspective of producers, the auction system is superior to one in which 
exporters and producers negotiate at the farm gate.   
Thirdly, at the producer level, the combination of the removal of pan-
seasonal, pan-territorial pricing systems; the opening up of the purchasing 
system for coffee; and the rising cost of inputs, have all resulted in price 
transmission asymmetries. Positive price movements at the international level 
have not been proportionally passed on while the transmission of negative 
commodity price movements to producers is exacerbated.  
Finally, the above changes in the domestic marketing, pricing and 
production structures for coffee have also led to a differentiation in price 
experience and impact. Within Kilimanjaro region, producers linked to the 
KNCU cooperative system, who tend to be wealthier producers, are more 
protected from within season price changes. Poorer producers, selling to 
private agents, are most exposed to the negative price shifts.   
Current discussions on remedying the transmission and impact of unstable 
commodity prices have tended to focus either on the international and financial 
dimension at the international level or have considered aspects relevant to 
commodity producers. This paper, having considered the transmission of 
prices from international financial markets down to producers has 
demonstrated the importance of integrating these areas of research and policy. 
If the aim of policy is to protect those most vulnerable to the detrimental 
effects of commodity price instability, then both developments at the 
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